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Introduction 
Ukraine is one of the largest and youngest democratic states. It can also 
potentially benefi t from the geopolitical stability on the continent the 
most. What is interesting in the context of current Ukrainian transfor-
mations is the experience of Poland, a state which, too, has recently 
regained independence and which, like Ukraine – albeit to a much 
lesser extent now – has to struggle with the remnants of Communist 
legal solutions. For decades, these solutions determined not only the 
structure and operational principles of public authorities but, fi rst and 
foremost, the depth and scope of the administrative restrictions of po-
litical rights and freedoms.
Indubitably, one of the most important freedoms is freedom of as-
sembly, upon which every civil society is based1. Moreover, freedom of 
assembly is an essential structural component of the right to participate 
1 As Iwanowski rightly stressed, various forms of human and civil activities directed 
at solving issues considered as important for a given community are essential for the 
civil society, which is based on free initiative (S. Iwanowski, Prawne formy organizowania 
się społeczeństwa, “Samorząd Terytorialny” 2010, no. 1–2, p. 22); the signifi cance of civil 
society is also highlighted by Pułło, among others, who considers the protection of such 
a society as a constitutional principle and “the best guarantee of maintaining a dem-
ocratic system” (A. Pułło, Zasada ochrony społeczeństwa obywatelskiego w systemie zasad 
konstytucyjnych, “Gdańskie Studia Prawnicze” 2012, no. 2, p. 288). Also see: judgment of 
the European Court of Human Rights of 5 March 2009 in Banaco and France (complaint 
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in the conduct of public aff airs, derived directly from human digni-
ty – the fundamental value in the human rights system2. It could thus 
be assumed that the scope of protection of this freedom is a yardstick 
for the degree of democracy in any given country3. In particular, such 
a yardstick gains special importance in the context of states undergoing 
democratic transformations, for it enables the assessment of the attained 
transformation stage according to the administrative restriction of hu-
man rights in that country. 
The aim of this study is to analyse and evaluate the Ukrainian and 
Polish regulations of freedom of assembly. The chief research issue will 
be the answer to the question: how big are the administrative limitations 
of freedom in both countries? Do not the regulations applicable in both 
countries aff ect the essence of freedom? Do they suffi  ciently incorpo-
rate the international law? In order to achieve this aim and answer the 
questions above, the study has been divided into three parts. The fi rst 
part will outline how the international legal regulation of the freedom 
of assembly has been implemented in Poland and Ukraine; the second 
will analyse the issue of constitutional guarantees of the freedom of 
assemblies in Ukraine and the limitations of this freedom permitted 
under Ukrainian law; the third and fi nal part will contain the discussion 
on the form of administrative regulation of assemblies in Poland4. This 
division into parts dealing with Ukrainian and Polish law solutions 
separately has been made not only because of the subject matter and 
31684 05): theses, the actual state of aff airs and obiter dicta in: M.A. Nowicki, Europejski 
Trybunał Praw Człowieka. Wybór orzeczeń 2009, Warszawa 2010, p. 319.
2 Besides freedom of assembly, the list of such freedoms compiled by Olej niczak-
Szałowska includes freedom of association, right of access to public service, freedom to 
express opinions and to acquire and disseminate information, right to public informa-
tion, electoral rights, right to participate in national and local referenda, right to launch 
a popular legislative initiative, and fi nally right to submit petitions, applications, and 
complaints, also in public interest (E. Olejniczak-Szałowska, Prawo do uczestnictwa w kie-
rowaniu sprawami publicznymi we wspólnotach samorządowych w świetle dyrektywy Rady 
94/80/WE, “Samorząd Terytorialny” 2006, no. 1–2, p. 5). 
3 Jaskiernia includes even freedom of demonstrations, along with freedom of oral 
and written expression, privacy of correspondence, and freedom to create associations, 
organizations, and political parties in his “most general approach” to the principle of 
 political pluralism (J. Jaskiernia, Zasada pluralizmu politycznego w projektach nowej kon-
stytucji RP, “Państwo i Prawo” 1991, no. 10, p. 20).
4 The way the content of the study is divided (the clear separation of the parts con-
cerning Ukrainian and Polish law) is not only because of its content but also the necessity 
to precisely attribute the authorship of its individual sections. 
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content, but also in order to precisely attribute the authorship of its 
individual sections.
1. Freedom of assembly under the international law 
instruments binding Poland and Ukraine
The issue of the right to organise assemblies including “both private 
meetings and meetings in public thoroughfares as well as static meetin-
gs and public processions”, which “can be exercised by individuals and 
those organising the assembly”5 is of such a tremendous importance 
within the system of human rights that it is addressed in various co-
nventions, both universal and regional. In terms of the interpretation 
of freedom, the signifi cance of these acts is fundamental, since in the 
domain of individual rights the international law has gained prece-
dence over constitutional orders6. It has to be remembered, however, 
that the treaties concerning human rights contain no provisions making 
them directly applicable to the territory of the states – parties to the 
convention. Therefore, the possible direct application of the norms of 
the treaties and their incorporation into national law depends on the 
form of constitutional regulations7. The particular status of international 
regulations pertaining to human rights is taken into account in many 
constitutions; for instance, in Russia and Romania international stan-
dards are meant to be a uniform interpretation criterion of the rights 
guaranteed by the constitution; in the Czech Republic and Slovakia, the 
precedence of conventions on human rights over statutes are openly 
5 The Judgment of the European Court of Human Rights of 20 February 2003 in the 
case of Djavit An v. Turkey (Application no. 20652/92); the theses, factual status, and 
discussion of the ruling in: M.A. Nowicki, Nowy Europejski Trybunał Praw Człowieka. Wybór 
orzeczeń 1999–2004, Kraków 2005, p. 1156.
6 C. Mik, Międzynarodowe uwarunkowania konstytucyjnej regulacji praw człowieka (prob-
lemy podstawowe), “Państwo i Prawo” 1990, no. 12, p. 38. It is worth adding that the inter-
action between the international and domestic orders is bilateral and mutual: the eff ect 
of the international order can be observed in the activities of local institutions just as 
the infl uence of national orders is manifested in the practice of international bodies. 
More in: B. Kołaczkowski, Kształtowanie się regulacji prawnych zgromadzeń w Polsce oraz 
w wybranych krajach o anglosaskiej tradycji prawnej, Warszawa 2014, p. 7.
7 Cf. L. Wiśniewski, Stosowanie międzynarodowych konwencji o prawach człowieka (na 
tle orzecznictwa organów sądowych i działalności Rzecznika Praw Obywatelskich), “Państwo 
i Prawo” 1992, no. 12, p. 52. 
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stated and directly applied8. Whereas in Ukraine international treaties 
recognised by the Supreme Council (Ukr. Verkhovna Rada) are an integral 
part of the national legal order9. Conversely, Art. 91(1) of the Polish 
Constitution (Pol. Konstytucja RP) of 2 April 199710 provides that: “[a]fter 
promulgation thereof in the Journal of Laws of the Republic of Poland 
(Dziennik Ustaw), a ratifi ed international agreement shall constitute 
part of the domestic legal order and shall be applied directly, unless 
its application depends on the enactment of a statute.” Moreover, “an 
international agreement ratifi ed upon prior consent granted by statute 
[has] precedence over the statute” if the provisions of the latter cannot 
be reconciled with such an agreement (Art. 91(2) of the Polish Consti-
tution). 
Acts of international law binding both Poland and Ukraine include:
A. the Universal Declaration of Human Rights;
B. the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights;
C. the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms;
D. the Convention on the Rights of the Child;
E. the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minor-
ities; and
F. the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities.
Ad A) The Universal Declaration of Human rights 
The fi rst act of international law in which the right to organise as-
semblies was directly specifi ed is the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights, adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on 10 Decem-
ber 1948 by 48 votes in favour, none against and eight abstaining. The 
Ukraine and Poland were among the latter11. According to Art. 20(1) of 
the Declaration, “[e]veryone has the right to freedom of peaceful as-
sembly and association.” The lack of precision of the regulation found 
8 W. Sokolewicz, Nowa rola konstytucji w postsocjalistycznych państwach Europy, “Pań-
stwo i Prawo” 2000, no. 10, p. 30.
9 Cf. Art. 9 of the Constitution of Ukraine adopted on 28 June 1996: „International 
treaties that are in force, agreed to be binding by the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, are 
part of the national legislation of Ukraine”; the text of the Constitution is available at: 
http://www.legislationline.org/documents/section/constitutions/country/52 (accessed: 
18 I 2016).
10 Dz.U. (J.L.) No. 78, item 483 as amended.
11 The text of the Declaration is available online: http://www.un.org/en/univer-
sal-declaration-human-rights/ (accessed: 3 III 2016).
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in the Declaration is understandable due to its nature: it is a resolu-
tion, not an international agreement imposing specifi c obligations on 
states. Despite having the form of a resolution, the Declaration is of 
great importance, particularly concerning the political realities of the 
period directly after World War II and the will, common among the 
democratic states of the time, to defi ne a new legal order – in the areas 
of both international law and domestic laws12. This order is founded on 
as broad as possible establishment of the system of fundamental hu-
man rights. It is worth noting that from the text of the Declaration, the 
cornerstone of the international system of protection of human rights, 
the necessity to formulate limitations of these laws is obvious. In line 
with the wording of Art. 29(2), restrictions on rights are acceptable for 
the purpose of recognition and respect of the rights and freedoms of 
others and fulfi lling the requirements of morality, public order, and the 
general welfare in a democratic society. 
Ad B) The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights13, adopted 
on 16 December 1966 (Poland ratifi ed the Covenant on 18 March 1977 
while the Ukraine did it already on 12 November 197314) aff ects the 
legal orders of the states which ratifi ed it more than the Declaration 
does because, contrary to the latter, it is an international agreement. 
The Covenant, one of the Covenants on Human Rights, is thus the 
basis on which the internal regulations in individual countries are 
shaped. In non-legal contexts, it is sometimes even called the “uni-
versal synthesis of humanism” or the “exemplary catalogue of human 
rights which confi rms the existing possibility of agreement between 
the supporters of various political ideas on the most important matters 
of humankind”15. 
Freedom of assembly is stipulated in Art. 21 of the Covenant, ac-
cording to which “[t]he right of peaceful assembly shall be recognised.” 
Similarly to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights discussed 
above, the Covenant also contains provisions permitting limitations 
12 Ibidem.
13 J.L. 1977 No. 38, item 167 (att.).
14 Data available online at: https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?s-
rc=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-4&chapter=4&lang=en (accessed: 20 I 2016).
15 Cf., e.g.: A. Bisztyga, Przedmowa, in: Europejska Konwencja Praw Człowieka, Międzynaro-
dowy Pakt Praw Obywatelskich i Politycznych, Katowice 1992, p. 7; L. Wiśniewski, Gwarancje 
podstawowych praw i wolności obywateli PRL, Wrocław 1981, p. 17–18.
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of freedom of assembly. It is obvious from the wording of the remain-
der of the aforementioned Art. 21 that the limitations of freedom of 
assembly are acceptable provided that two requirements are fulfi lled: 
they must be introduced by law as well as be necessary for the rea-
sons of national security or public safety, protection of public order, 
protection of public health or morality and, fi nally, the protection of 
the rights and freedoms of others. Whereas the specifi c condition 
for the limitation of freedoms guaranteed by the covenant, including 
freedom of assembly, is an exceptional “public emergency which 
threatens the life of the nation” – pursuant to Art. 4(1), “[i]n time of 
public emergency which threatens the life of the nation and the exist-
ence of which is offi  cially proclaimed, the States Parties to the present 
Covenant may take measures derogating from their obligations under 
the present Covenant to the extent strictly required by the exigencies 
of the situation, provided that such measures are not inconsistent with 
their other obligations under international law and do not involve 
discrimination solely on the ground of race, colour, sex, language, 
religion or social origin.”
Provisions indirectly applicable to the freedom of assembly can also 
be found in Art. 18(1) of the Covenant. While this article concerns 
the freedom of thought, conscience, and religion, it also stipulates the 
freedom to manifest one’s religion or belief “either individually or in 
community with others and in public or private”; moreover, this freedom 
“may be subject only to such limitations as are prescribed by law and 
are necessary to protect public safety, order, health, or morals or the 
fundamental rights and freedoms of others” (Art. 18(3) of the Covenant).
It is worth noting that the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
stresses the principle of equality similarly to the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights discussed above: “Each State Party to the present 
Covenant undertakes to respect and to ensure to all individuals within 
its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognised in the 
present Covenant, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, 
sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social 
origin, property, birth or other status” (Art. 2(1) of the Covenant).
Ad C) The European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights 
and Fundamental Freedoms
Freedom of assembly is also regulated by the acts of international law 
at the regional level. One such a regional act of international law which 
has been ratifi ed by Poland as well as the Ukraine (on 19 January 1993 
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and 11 September 1997, respectively16) is the European Convention for 
the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms established 
on 4 November 195017. This convention is the best known instrument 
for protection of individual rights in the framework of the Council of 
Europe and also the historically fi rst international treaty to implement 
the idea of overall protection of human rights18. 
Concerning assemblies, the Convention, in a similar way to the Uni-
versal Declaration of Human Rights, regulates this right in combination 
with the freedom of association, including the right to create and join 
trade unions in a common regulation. Pursuant to Art. 11(1) of the 
Convention, “[e]veryone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly 
and to freedom of association with others, including the right to form 
and to join trade unions for the protection of his interests.” Conditions 
justifying the limitation of these rights are defi ned in Art. 11(2). This 
catalogue of circumstances was formulated very broadly, similarly to 
the universal acts of international law. The permissible limitations are 
those which are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of 
national or public safety, protection of order and prevention of crime, 
protection of health and morality, or protection of rights and freedoms 
of others. The Convention also provides for the possibility to restrict 
the exercise of freedom of assembly by members of armed forces, police, 
and the administration of the state.
While stressing the signifi cance of the Convention for the protection 
of the right to organise assemblies, to associate, and other fundamental 
rights, one should note that it establishes the European Court of Human 
Rights as the institution aimed at protecting the rights provided by the 
Convention in practice19. Indubitably, the prospect of international ac-
countability before the Court for non-compliance with the obligation 
contributes to improving the effi  ciency of the activities of the state in 
areas of both legislation an execution of existing law20. The signifi -
cance of the case-law of the Court is enormous, since it defi nes “what 
the standards ensuing from Art. 11 demand from the member states of 
16 Data available online at: http://www.coe.int/en/web/conventions/full-list/-/
conventions/treaty/005/signatures?p_auth=QUCpRayD (accessed: 20 I 2016).
17 J.L. 1993 No. 61, item 284 as amended.
18 A. Wiśniewski, O historii Europejskiej Konwencji Praw Człowieka, “Gdańskie Studia 
Prawnicze” 2009, no. 1, p. 397.
19 Section II of the Convention.
20 P. Bachmat, Uwagi na temat horyzontalnego oddziaływania Europejskiej Konwencji Praw 
Człowieka, “Państwo i Prawo” 2001, no. 10, p. 91.
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the Convention”21. In other words, the rulings of the Court: “set out the 
standards to follow in European democracies”22. I.C. Kamiński provided 
an accurate analysis of the judgments delivered by the Court regarding 
the freedom of assemblies, in which he indicated among other things 
that both, in the case of a legal, peaceful demonstration as well as in the 
event of an illegal gathering, an immediate use of force by the police 
constitutes not only a violation under Art. 11 of the Convention, but 
it may also lead to a breach of Art. 3, in the part forbidding inhuman 
or degrading treatment (if the demonstrators suff ered injuries of suffi  -
cient magnitude). The Court also stressed a number of times that small 
demonstrations do not give rise to serious risks to public order even 
if they are illegal or organised by banned organisations23. Further, as 
can be derived from various judicial decisions, the essence of freedom 
and organising manifestations is contained in the possibility given to 
each citizen of expressing an opinion or an objection, as well as in: 
“challenging each decision of any authority”24. In many decisions this re-
lationship between the freedom to express an opinion and the freedom 
of assembly is particularly emphasised. For example, in the judgment 
of 11 January 2007 in Kuznecov v. Russia25 the Court stressed that: “The 
right to freedom of assembly is intimately connected with the right to 
freedom of expression: by facilitating eff ective forms of public protest, 
the former right provides a practical means by which the latter right 
21 I.C. Kamiński, Wolność zgromadzeń i stowarzyszania się (art. 11) w orzecznictwie 
ETPCz za lata 2008–2009, “Europejski Przegląd Sądowy” 2010, no. 9, p. 31, 36–37. The 
author made an accurate analysis of the judgments of the Court regarding the freedom 
of assembly, which indicates, among other things, that not only in the case of a legal, 
peaceful demonstration but also an illegal gathering, an immediate use of force by the 
police not only constitutes a violation of Art. 11 of the Convention but may also lead 
to the breach of Art. 3 in the part forbidding inhuman or degrading treatment (if the 
demonstrators suff ered serious enough injuries). The court has also stressed many 
times that numerically small demonstrations do not give rise to serious risks for the 
public order even when they are illegal and organised by banned organisations (more 
in: B. Kołaczkowski, op. cit., p. 13–14).
22 B. Baczyńska, Granice wolności zgromadzeń i stowarzyszania na podstawie orzecznic-
twa strasburskiego – wybrane zagadnienia, in: Prawne aspekty wolności. Zbiór studiów, ed. by 
E. Cała-Wacinkiewicz and D. Wacinkiewicz, Toruń 2008, p. 212.
23 More in: B. Kołaczkowski, op. cit., p. 13–14.
24 Judgment of the ECHR of 3 February 2009 in Women on Waves et al v. Portugal 
(complaint No. 31276/05), thesis, the actual state of aff airs and discussion in: M.A. No-
wicki, Europejski Trybunał. Wybór orzeczeń 2009, p. 263.
25 Complaint No. 10877/04 see in: M. Elliott, R. Thomas, Public Law, Oxford 2011, 
p. 816.
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can be exercised.” These relationships were even better analysed in 
judgments of 29 June 2006 – Ollinger v. Austria26 and of 13 February 
2003 – Refah Partisi v. Turkey27. In the former case it was held that: “the 
protection of the freedom of making and expressing opinions is one of 
the objectives of the freedom of assembly” while in the latter, which 
even more overtly emphasised the relationship between the freedom 
to express opinions and the freedom of assembly, the Court held that: 
“the protection of opinion and freedom to express it […] is one of the 
objectives of the freedom of assembly and association.”
It is worth noting that judicial decisions are not uniform and vary con-
siderably, which means that actual infl uence of the standards referred to 
above have a limited eff ect on the application of domestic regulations, 
which is particularly true in Ukraine where the rules governing assem-
blies come from the times when it was one of the Soviet republics, and 
its application is frequently far from standards observed in democratic 
states (more on that in Part 2 of this article). Two judgments may be 
quoted here: one of 10 October 1979 in Rassemblement Jurassien Unite 
Jurassienne v. Switzerland28 and one of 15 March 1984 in A. Associa-
tion and H v. Austria29. In Rassemblement Jurassien Unite Jurassienne 
v. Switzerland the judgment concerned the freedom of a state to de-
cide upon possible limitations of the freedom of assembly. The dispute 
involved a temporary prohibition of any political assembly issued by 
Bern canton authority in respect of one town in Switzerland. Despite 
the ban, a demonstration was organised and it eventually turned into 
clashes between the police and the demonstrators. The organisers of 
the demonstration accused the authorities of violation of the freedom 
of assembly and freedom to express opinions guaranteed, inter alia, 
under Articles 10 and 11 of the European Convention of Human Rights. 
The matter was referred to the European Court of Human Rights which 
upheld the arguments presented by the Swiss government. Of particular 
interest is the Court’s refl exion that: “the public interest in the freedom 
of assembly had to, temporarily, come second having regard to another, 
26 Complaint No. 769900/01, thesis, the actual state of aff airs and discussion in: 
M.A. Nowicki, Europejski Trybunał. Wybór orzeczeń 2009, p. 263.
27 Complaints 41340/98, 41342/98 and 41344/98; thesis, the actual state of aff airs 
and discussion in: M.A. Nowicki, Europejski Trybunał. Wybór orzeczeń 1999–2004, p. 1144.
28 ECHR 1979, the judgment can be accessed at: http://echr.ketse.com/
doc/8191.78=en-19791010/view (accessed: 1 III 2016).
29 App No. 9905/82, the judgment can be accessed at: http://echr.ketse.com/
doc/9905.82-en-19840315/view (accessed: 1 III 2016).
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equally justifi ed public interest in a harmonious living in a community 
among citizens of a democratic society.” Other arguments by the ECHR 
also prove that the European Court of Human Rights opted for a wide 
interpretation of the circumstances justifying far-reaching limitations of 
the freedom of assembly and granted s state considerable freedom to as-
sess the legality of the limitations of the right to the freedom of assembly. 
These theses are not easy to reconcile with refl exions contained in other 
judgments, for instance in Ollinger v. Austria quoted above, in which 
the Court decided that: “a state must refrain from intervening in the right 
of freedom of assembly, including demonstrations that may irritate or 
off end other persons.” The second of the two judgments mentioned 
above also emphasised the primacy of other interests and freedoms 
over the freedom of assembly and concerned permissibility of issuing 
a decision to ban carrying an assembly. Among arguments justifying this 
decision was a threat to national security resulting from the slogans or 
words used during the assembly. In its decision the Court stood along-
side the government of Austria, and emphasised that a “negation of the 
conception of the Austrian nation […] and the pressure on the German 
nature of Austria justifi ed the concerns of Austrian government that 
the proposed meeting might be used as a platform to activate a policy 
against Austrian independence and separation from Germany.” As can 
be seen, the Court decided that in the event of introducing by the state of 
the limitation, it was especially important that this limitation is properly 
justifi ed rather that the very scope of the limitation30. 
Ad D) The Convention on the Rights of the Child
The Convention on the Rights of the Child was adopted by the United 
Nations General Assembly on 20 November 1989. Poland ratifi ed the con-
vention on 7 June 199131, while Ukraine did so on 28 August of the same 
year32. This Convention interprets human rights from the viewpoint of 
the interests and needs of a child. It follows from the provisions contained 
therein that the states only ensure the exercise of the rights, which are 
therefore are applicable to children not as granted by the state but ob-
jectively, fl owing from the essence of humanity33. The Convention on 
30 More in: B. Kołaczkowski, op. cit., p. 13.
31 J.L. 1991 No. 120, item 526 as amended.
32 Information available online: https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?s-
rc=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-11&chapter=4&lang=en (accessed: 20 I 2016). 
33 J. Sandorski, Autorski projekt konwencji o prawach rodziny, in: Rodzina w świetle prawa 
i polityki społecznej, ed. by T. Smyczyński, Poznań 1990, p. 119. 
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the Rights of the Child directly guarantees fundamental political rights 
to children, recognising as a child “every human being below the age 
of eighteen years unless under the law applicable to the child, majority 
is attained earlier” (Art. 1 of the Convention). Freedom of assembly is 
guaranteed in Art. 15(1): “States Parties recognise the rights of the child 
to freedom of association and to freedom of peaceful assembly.” Naturally, 
the provisions of the Convention permit the limitation of these freedoms. 
Conditions for such limitations were formulated similarly to the permissi-
ble conditions for the limitations of freedom of association and freedom 
of assembly in the other acts of international law mentioned above.
Ad E & F) The Framework Convention for the Protection of National 
Minorities and the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities.
The Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities 
defi nes the minimum standard for the protection of these minorities, 
guaranteeing such rights as freedoms of assembly and association. The 
Convention was open for signature in Strasbourg on 1 February 1995 and 
came into force on 1 February 1998. It was ratifi ed on 20 December 2000 
in Poland, and even earlier in Ukraine, on 28 January 199834. Whereas 
the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities was estab-
lished in New York on 13 December 2006. It was ratifi ed by Poland on 
25 August 2012 and on 4 February 2010 by Ukraine35. It is characteristic 
of the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities 
that it includes only program provisions which do not create personal 
rights for individuals (the implementation of these rights in domestic 
legal orders was left to the parties of the Convention). It is due to the 
Preamble which stressed that the principles set out by the Convention 
would be implemented through national legislation and appropriate gov-
ernmental programs36. According to Art. 7 of the Framework Convention, 
“[t]he Parties shall ensure respect for the right of every person belonging 
to a national minority to freedom of peaceful assembly, freedom of as-
sociation, freedom of expression, and freedom of thought, conscience 
and religion”37. While the Convention on the Rights of Persons with 
34 Data is available online at: http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/minorities/1_
AtGlance/PDF_MapMinorities_bil.pdf (accessed: 20 I 2016).
35 Data available online at: https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?s-
rc=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-15&chapter=4&lang=en (accessed: 20 I 2016).
36 Cf. P. Suski, Stowarzyszenia i fundacje, Warszawa 2008, p. 100.
37 Text of the convention: J.L. 2002 No. 22, item 209; https://rm.coe.int/CoERM-
PublicCommonSearchServices/DisplayDCTMContent?documentId=09000016800c10cf 
(accessed: 3 III 2016).
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Disabilities does not contain any provisions directly pertaining to the 
freedom of assembly, its careful analysis indicates that some of them 
are signifi cant in the context of the freedom in question. What comes 
to the fore is Art. 21 of the Convention, according to which: “States 
Parties shall take all appropriate measures to ensure that persons with 
disabilities can exercise the right to freedom of expression and opinion, 
including the freedom to seek, receive and impart information and ideas 
on an equal basis with others and through all forms of communication 
of their choice”, as well as Art. 29: “States Parties shall guarantee to 
persons with disabilities political rights and the opportunity to enjoy 
them on an equal basis with others”38. The right to peaceful assembly is 
inextricably linked with freedom of expressing one’s opinions and, fi rst 
and foremost, is a political right. Therefore it is an obligation of States 
Parties of the Convention to guarantee the possibility of exercising this 
right to persons with disabilities to the same extent as to other persons.
2. The Outline of the Regulation of Assemblies in Ukraine
Ukraine considers itself to be rule of law state based on democratic 
principles. As well as in other democratic countries the main legal act 
is Constitution. The Constitution of Ukraine has the highest legal pow-
er. Laws and regulations are adopted on the basis of the Constitution 
of Ukraine and should correspond to it. Norms of the Constitution of 
Ukraine are norms of direct action39. According to the Constitution 
of Ukraine, adopted at the fi fth session of the Supreme Council of 
Ukraine on 28 June 1996: “citizens have the right to assemble peacefully 
without arms and to hold meetings, rallies, processions and demon-
strations, upon notifying in advance the bodies of executive power or 
bodies of local self-government.” Restrictions on the exercise of this right 
may be established by a court in accordance with the law and only in 
the interests of national security and public order, with the purpose of 
preventing disturbances or crimes, protecting the health of the popu-
lation, or protecting the rights and freedoms of other persons (Art. 39). 
38 http://www.un.org/disabilities/documents/convention/convoptprot-e.pdf 
(accessed: 3 III 2016).
39 Cf. Art. 8: “The norms of the Constitution of Ukraine are norms of direct eff ect. 
Appeals to the court in defence of the constitutional rights and freedoms of the individ-
ual and citizen directly on the grounds of the Constitution of Ukraine are guaranteed.” 
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Regarding legal regulation, Ukraine does not have any modern leg-
islative act that would cover the range of problems that may occur in 
connection with the right of assemblies, similar to that existing under 
Polish law on assemblies. It is also necessary to point out here that the 
legislative act of the Soviet Union: Decree of the Supreme Soviet of 
USSR “On the procedure for organising and holding meetings, rallies, 
marches and demonstrations in the USSR” of 7 July 1988 is still in use, re-
gardless the existence of international standards providing otherwise40.
What can be seen from the surveys carried out in 2013 in Ukrainian 
communes as many as 199 regarded a decree to constitute the basic 
legislative act in the sphere of the administrative regulation of assem-
blies, while 205 communes never used a decree and the remaining 
communes failed to provide an unequivocal answer41. Another serious 
problem, not encountered in countries with more stable democracies 
such as e.g. Poland, is that in Ukraine there occur certain unlawful 
regulations of local governments that limit the constitutional right to 
peaceful assemblies:42
− only citizens of the age of 18 or above can participate in mass 
events (48 cities),
− banners and slogans are to be approved by the executive committee 
(12 cities),
− at least three persons should be organisers of peaceful gatherings 
(10 cities),
− there is a ban on the use of loudspeakers (9 cities)
− a special permission for a meeting is necessary (3 cities, although it 
is noteworthy that the Council of Dzershinks required that a copy of the 
decision allowing a meeting is sent to the local National Security branch 
and to the Ministry of the Interior branches of Donetsk oblast and to 
the prosecutor’s offi  ce. A similar request was also made in Sverdlovsk
− the restrictions are justifi ed by alleged “lack of space.” In Obukhiv 
a specifi c size (in square meters) of space to be used near offi  cial build-
ings, enterprises and institutions was determined.
Pursuant to the Decree of 1988 it is “advisable” to notify43:
40 The text of the act is available at the website: http://search.ligazakon.ua/l_doc2.
nsf/link1/PC889306.html (accessed: 18 I 2016).
41 Data available on http://world.maidan.org.ua/2014/freedom-of-peaceful-gather-
ings-2013 (accessed: 27 V 2016).
42 See also ibidem.
43 Cf. point 1 of the Decree.
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− The executive body of village, town council (except Kyiv) – if a peace-
ful assembly is to be expected within the territory of the village, city;
− Kyiv city state administration – if a peaceful assembly is to be held 
held in Kyiv;
− Regional state administration – if a peaceful assembly is to be ex-
pected on the territory of the district (region).
It is important to add that if a peaceful assembly is planned on route 
which runs through the territory of several regions or Kyiv, the organiser 
of a peaceful assembly is advised to give written notice to each regional 
state administration as well as to the and Kyiv city state administration.
It is also worth noting that there is no legislative act in Ukraine 
that defi nes the exact date when a notice of an assembly should be 
given. An important tip for the organisers of assemblies is decision 
No. 1–30/2001N 4-rp/2001  of The Constitutional Court of Ukraine44. 
The Court said that the authorities should be informed in time suffi  -
cient for them to understand the legacy of such assemblies and in some 
case to solve to problematic issues in court; this judgment mentioned 
that “before an assembly” can mean any sensible term before the event, 
sometimes the authorities can be notifi ed of an assembly several hours 
before it. However, pursuant to the Decree of the Supreme Soviet of 
the USSR “On the procedure of organising and holding meetings, rallies, 
marches and demonstrations in the USSR”, it is necessary to notify the 
authorities 10 days before the assembly (point 2 of the Decree). 
In the same Decree, also certain prohibitions for the members of 
the assemblies are mentioned. According to the Decree members are 
prohibited to carry weapons, or other objects especially prepared or 
adapted that could be used against life and health, or cause material 
injury to the government, public organisations and citizens (point 4 of 
the Decree). In the Decree it is not outlined who can organise an assem-
bly, it is only necessary to refer to international legislation applicable 
and binding in Ukraine. And so, pursuant to Art. 11 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights, “Everyone has the right of freedom of 
44 Decision of the Constitutional Court of Ukraine in the case of the constitutional 
petition of the Ministry of Internal Aff airs of Ukraine concerning offi  cial interpretation 
of provision of Article 39 of the Constitution of Ukraine about advance notifi cation of 
executive power or local authorities on holding meetings, rallies, marches and demon-
strations (case of advance notifi cation of peaceful assembly) Kyiv, April 19, 2001 Case 
N 1–30 / 2001 N 4-rp / 2001 (http://zakon5.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/v004p710–01, 
accessed: 20 I 2016).
Studia Prawa Publicznego 2016-15 – 2 kor.indd   42 2016-10-04   19:06:26
43The administra  ve limita  on of assemblies in Ukraine and Poland
peaceful assembly and freedom of association with others, including 
the right to form unions and join them to protect their interests.”
Ukrainian law also provides that, like in other democratic countries, 
the organiser (organisers) of meetings, rallies, marches, demonstrations 
or other peaceful assemblies have the right to appeal to the adminis-
trative court at the place of these measures with a claim for removal of 
restrictions on the right to peaceful assembly by executive bodies, local 
authorities, notifi ed of such events (according to para. 1 of Article 183 
of the Code of Administrative Legal Proceedings of Ukraine) 45. 
Problems of assembly control and responsibilities of the organiser 
(chairman of the meeting) are the only subject of rudimentary regulation. 
One can merely indicate the records already quoted in the Supreme So-
viet decree of 1988: “meetings, rallies, marches, demonstrations should 
be terminated at the request of the authorities, if not given application, 
the decision to ban take place, as well as violation of the order of their 
conduct, risks to life and health, disturbing public order” (point 7 of the 
Decree) and also “Persons who violate the established order of an or-
ganisation and holding meetings, rallies, marches and demonstrations, 
should be responsible under the legislation of the USSR and Union re-
publics. Material damage caused during the assembly, rallies, marches 
and demonstrations by the participants of state cooperative and other 
public organisations or citizens shall be reimbursed in accordance with 
the law” (point 8 of the Decree). In the context of supervision of the 
assemblies it is worth noting that this decree also defi nes the universal 
premise of the decision on the prohibition of the meeting – “the Ex-
ecutive Committee of the Council of Deputies can ban the meetings, 
rallies, marches or demonstrations if their purpose does not correspond 
with the Constitution of the USSR, the Constitution and the Union of 
autonomous republics or threatens public order and security of citizens” 
(point 6 of the Decree). 
It is also worth noting that the legal norms regarding assemblies 
are not applied for public entertainment, activities for vacations, sports 
events, wedding processions, folk festivals etc. There are also religious 
gatherings conducted by religious organisations as public worship, re-
ligious rites, funerals, ceremonies and processions – none of them is 
regulated by law.
45 The Code of administrative legal proceedings of Ukraine (http://yurist-online.
com/en/kodeks/022.php, accessed: 20 I 2016).
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As has been mentioned above, Ukraine’s Constitution provides for 
limitations of freedom of assembly that may be introduced by a judicial 
decision. Ukrainian courts often see an assembly as a threat to national 
security and public order in the event of46:
1. lack of information about the person in charge, the number of 
participants, the time of the assembly or if the gathering is planned in 
the “wrong” place;
2. simultaneous events;
3. failure of the authorities to ensure public order or the security of 
traffi  c and pedestrians;
4. a danger to the health or morals;
5. possible obstacles or inconveniences on the rights of persons not 
involved in peaceful assembly;
6. potential damage to the image and reputation of state power.
For example, a visit to the Ukrainian website of court decisions and 
typing the keyword ‘зібрaння’ which means ‘assemblies’ will provide 
a list of numerous court decisions forbidding:
− Case 9681/10/1570 No. 2a – Decision on restrictions on the right 
to peaceful assembly of 12 October, 2010 Odessa because of unsuitable 
place of assembly47;
− Case 2a/1570/3571/2011 – Decision on restrictions on the right 
to peaceful assembly of 18 May, 2011 Odessa of unsuitable place of 
assembly48 etc.
It is also noteworthy that the rationale for the decisions delivered 
by Ukrainian courts (and those delivered by courts of higher instance 
in particular) show at times a certain weakness of the Ukrainian regu-
lation and a lack of compliance with the Constitution or the European 
standards. And so, in the judgment of the Babushkinsky District Court 
of Dnipropetrovsk of 30 March 2007 in the case of S. v. the Executive 
Committee of the Dnipropetrovsk City Council concerning the adoption 
46 Cf., e.g., Decision of Mykolayiv County Administrative Court of 30 XI 2010, 
case No. 2a-8357/10/1470 (http://reyestr.court.gov.ua/Review/12574576, accessed: 
20 I 2016).
47 Case 9681/10/1570 No. 2a – Decision on restrictions on the right to peaceful 
assembly on October 12, 2010 Odessa (http://reyestr.court.gov.ua/Review/47067473, 
accessed: 27 V 2016).
48 Case 2a/1570/3571/2011 – Decision on restrictions on the right to peaceful assem-
bly on May 18, 2011 Odessa (http://reyestr.court.gov.ua/Review/51857004, accessed: 
27 V 2016).
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of regulations on holding mass events in the city of Dnipropetrovsk, the 
court held, that the procedures for exercising the right to freedom of 
assembly and the procedures and grounds for restricting the right were 
not regulated by Ukrainian legislation and therefore the Council had no 
grounds to adopt the impugned regulation, which would interfere with 
the rights of citizens49. In another case the Kyiv Administrative Court, 
in a judgment of 29 November 2011, restricted the right of several or-
ganisations and private persons to hold a demonstration on account, in 
particular, of their failure to notify the Kyiv City State Administration of 
their intention ten days in advance. The court referred to the abovemen-
tioned 1988 Decree. The participants appealed against that judgment. 
On 16 May 2012 the Kyiv Administrative Court of Appeal quashed 
the judgment of the fi rst-instance court. In its decision the Court of 
Appeal noted that the 1988 Decree confl icted with the Constitution as 
it required the organisers to seek permission to hold a demonstration 
and authorised the executive authorities to ban such an event, where-
as Article 39 of the Constitution provided that the authorities should 
be notifi ed that a demonstration was being planned, and empowered 
only the judicial authorities to place restrictions on the organisation 
thereof. The court also noted that the judgment of the fi rst-instance 
court was incompatible not only with Article 39 of the Constitution 
but also with Art. 11 of the European Convention50. In other case the 
Kyiv Administrative Court of Appeal, in a decision of 11 October 2012, 
quashed the judgment of the Kyiv Administrative Court, which had 
restricted the freedom of peaceful assembly in respect of a number of 
political and non-governmental organisations upon an application by 
the Kyiv City State Administration. In its decision the Administrative 
Court of Appeal also noted that the 1988 Decree confl icted with the 
Constitution as it provided for a procedure for seeking permission to 
hold a demonstration and that the Decree concerned the holding of 
such events in a non-existent country (Soviet Union), regulated rela-
tions between the citizens of that country and the executive committees 
of the Soviets of People’s Deputies, and considered demonstrations 
on the basis of their compatibility with the Constitution of the Union 
and the autonomous republics, that is, non-existent constitutions of 
49 Data available in Part G of chapter “Relevant domestic law and practice” 2013. 
Vyerentsov v. Ukraine (http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001–118393, accessed: 27 V 2016).
50 Ibidem.
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non-existent subjects. The court also noted that under the Ukrainian 
Constitution human rights and freedoms, and the relevant safeguards, 
could be defi ned only by the laws of Ukraine51. 
 An analysis of decisions of the European Court on Human Rights 
that concern Ukraine, provides examples of cases where the issue of 
the terms or dates of notifying the authorities is raised. The absence 
of information on the terms of notifying the authorities about the 
planned assemblies or demonstrations was also raised in the case 
‘Shmushkovich v. Ukraine’ of 14 of November 2013. The court stated 
that applying the penalties to the applicant not for the breach of the 
rules of holding the picket but for the breach of the procedure of or-
ganisation based on the Decree of the Supreme Soviet of USSR “On 
the procedure for organising and holding meetings, rallies, marches 
and demonstrations in the USSR” of 28 July 1988  is the violation of 
the right to assemble freely in Ukraine52. Another important judg-
ment directly involving administrative regulation of assemblies in 
Ukraine is the decision of the European Court of Human Rights of 
11 April 2013 in Vyerentsov v. Ukraine. In this judgment the ECHR 
emphasized among other things that a structural problem dating 
back to the Soviet times and related specifi cally to the lack of re-
spective regulations on freedom of gatherings was still persisted in 
Ukraine. The Court proposed that Ukraine immediately reforms its 
legislation and administrative practice to set up the requirements to 
organise and conduct peaceful manifestations and the grounds for 
their restrictions. Even though the Court acknowledged that it could 
take some time for a country to establish its legislative framework 
during a transitional period like the one Ukraine was currently going 
through, it could not agree that a delay of more than 20 years was 
justifi able – especially when such a fundamental right as freedom of 
peaceful demonstration was at stake53. One of the most recent cases 
51 Ibidem.
52 M.V. Buromenskiy, The Right on Freedom of Association and Peaceful Assembly, in: 
European Convention on the Human Rights: basic statements, practice of usage, Ukrainian context, 
ed. by O.L. Zhukovska, Kyiv 2002, p. 621–626. 
53 See also: http://world.maidan.org.ua/2014/freedom-of-peaceful-gatherings-2013 
(accessed: 27 V 2016); the European Court of Human Rights held, unanimously, that 
there had been: a violation of Art. 11 (freedom of assembly and association) of the Eu-
ropean Convention on Human Rights, a violation of Art. 7 (no punishment without law) 
of the European Convention and a violation of Art. 6 §§ 1 and 3 (right to a fair trial). The 
case concerned a human rights activist who complained in particular that he had been 
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directly involved with the freedom of assemblies in Ukraine is Sirenko 
v. Ukraine (application no. 9078/1454) still pending. The European 
Court of Human Rights communicated to the Ukrainian Government 
the application and requested it to submit its observations. The case 
concerns a complaint by a participant in the ongoing protests in Kyiv 
(Ukraine) that he was beaten by the police and unlawfully detained. 
The applicant, Igor Sirenko, is a Ukrainian national. According to 
his submissions, he had taken part in the ongoing protests in central 
Kyiv since 29 November 2013. He states that he was beaten up by 
special police units during a violent dispersal of protesters and then 
unlawfully detained on 30 November 2013. He complains in this 
respect of a violation of Art. 3 (prohibition of inhuman or degrading 
treatment), Art. 5 (right to liberty and security), Art. 11 (freedom of 
assembly and association) and Art. 13 (right to an eff ective remedy) 
of the European Convention on Human Rights. Mr. Sirenko also 
complains that the measures employed by the authorities to deal 
with the demonstrations have been in violation of his – and other 
protesters’ – rights under Art. 3, Art. 5, Art. 8 (right to respect for 
private life), Art. 11 and Art. 13 (right to an eff ective remedy) of the 
Convention, and under Art. 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention 
(protection of property)55.
A consequence of the complicated history of the newest Ukraine 
are also so called The Ukrainian anti-protest laws restricting freedom 
of speech and freedom of assembly cancelled by the Parliament on 
28 January 2014. These laws were passed by the Parliament of Ukraine 
on 16 January 201456, (referred to as Black Thursday) and signed into 
sentenced to three days of administrative detention for holding a demonstration without 
permission, even though such permission was not required by domestic law. Relying 
on Art. 11 (freedom of assembly and association), Mr Vyerentsov complained that the 
interference with his right to freedom of peaceful assembly was neither prescribed by 
law nor necessary in a democratic society. Under Art. 7 (no punishment without law), 
he also claimed that he had been found guilty of breaching the procedure for holding 
demonstrations even though such a procedure was not clearly defi ned by law. Finally, 
he alleged a violation of Art. 6 §§ 1 and 3 (right to a fair trial), claiming that the court 
decision in his case had been ill-founded and that he had had no possibility to prepare 
his defence, to examine witnesses or to obtain the assistance of a lawyer.
54 Data available at: http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/app/conversion/pdf/?library=ECHR&
id=003–4657322–5642968&fi lename=003–4657322–5642968.pdf (accessed: 15 VI 2016).
55 Ibidem.
56 Information is available at the offi  cial web portal of Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine 
(http://www.rada.gov.ua, accessed: 20 I 2016).
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law by President Viktor Yanukovych, which caused massive anti-gov-
ernment protests called Maidan57. Apparently, these laws were called 
“dictatorship laws” by everybody who supported Euromaidan and who 
had any kind of knowledge of law58. Western nations also criticized 
the laws for their undemocratic nature and their ability to signifi cantly 
curb the rights to protest, free speech and the activity of non-govern-
mental organisations59. They were also called “draconian”, as they 
eff ectively established the dictatorship and were widely denounced 
internationally60.
The laws adopted on 16 January 2014 included or concerned61:
− restriction on driving cars in a queue of more than 5 cars;
− more severe consequences of traffi  c off ences. The fi ne to be paid 
by the owner of the car, not the driver;
57 Cf., e.g.: “In Ukraine, protesters appear to be preparing for battle”, The Washington 
Post 20 I 2014 (https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/in-ukraine-protesters-appear-
to-be-preparing-for-battle/2014/01/20/904cdc72–81bd-11e3–9dd4-e7278db80d86_story.
html, accessed: 20 I 2016); “Громaдські оргaнізaції зaкликaють до Всеукрaїнської мобілізaції”. 
Transparency International Ukraine (http://ti-ukraine.org/news/4272.html, accessed: 
20 I 2016). 
58 Cf., e.g.: “МЗС відповів ОБСЄ: «зaкони про диктaтуру» відповідaють усім демо-
крaтичним стaндaртaм”. Укрaїнськa прaвдa (http://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2014/01/
18/7009888/, accessed: 20 I 2016); “Крaвчук: зaкони про «диктaтуру» требa вдосконaлити” 
(www.Тиждень.ua, accessed: 20 I 2016); “Мaсові позови і нaродний фронт – відповідь 
прaвозaхисників нa «зaкони про диктaтуру»” (http://www.radiosvoboda.org/content/
article/25233727.html, accessed: 20 I 2016).
59 Cf., e.g.: Australians condemn new dictatorship laws in Ukraine, “Maidaner Efi m” (http://
world.maidan.org.ua/2014/australians-condemn-new-dictatorship-laws-in-ukraine, ac-
cessed: 20 I 2016); M. Danilova, Ukrainian protesters defy new draconian laws, “Toronto Star” 
(http://www.thestar.com/news/world/2014/01/19/ukraine_protesters_vent_frustra-
tion_with_opposition_leaders.html, accessed: 20 I 2016).
60 Cf., e.g., T.D. Snyder, Ukraine: The New Dictatorship, “The New York Review of Books” 
(http://www.nybooks.com/daily/2014/01/18/ukraine-new-dictatorship/?insrc=wbll, 
accessed: 20 I 2016).
61 Based on: Amendments to the Law of Ukraine “On the Judicial System and Sta-
tus of Judges” and procedural law on additional measures to protect the safety of citi-
zens [Verkhovna Rada (VVR), 2014, No. 22, p. 801] (http://zakon4.rada.gov.ua/laws/
show/721-vii, accessed: 20 I 2016); Amendments to some legislative acts of Ukraine 
concerning liability for administrative violations in the fi eld of road safety recorded 
automatically [Verkhovna Rada (VVR), 2014, No. 22, p. 803] (http://zakon3.rada.gov.
ua/laws/show/723–18, accessed: 20 I 2016); Amendments to the Regulations of the 
Verkhovna Rada Ukraine [Verkhovna Rada (VVR), 2014, No. 22, p. 804] (http://zakon3.
rada.gov.ua/laws/show/724–18, accessed: 20 I 2016); amendments to the Criminal 
Procedure Code of Ukraine on criminal proceedings in absentia [Verkhovna Rada (VVR), 
2014, No. 22, p. 805] (http://zakon3.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/725–18, accessed: 20 I 2016).
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− media restriction. Mass media must be approved government;
− breaking the rules of assemblies organisation that has become more 
expensive than it was;
− organisation of assemblies which now requires obtaining an ac-
ceptance of the militia;
−  prohibition to wear a helmet or a mask during an assembly;
− setting up tents that is now punishable by a fi ne of UAH 5000 or 
15 days of imprisonment;
− helping protesters is now punishable with a fi ne of UAH 10200;
− contempt of court (showing disrespect) is punishable by a fi ne of 
UAH 5100 or 15 days of imprisonment;
− showing disrespect to the requirements of the Security Service of 
Ukraine is punishable;
− publishing articles about extremist activity and calumniation in-
cluding on the Internet is punishable;
− parliamentary immunity has been cancelled;
− criminal proceedings in absentia have been introduced;
− blocking the access to a dwelling by a group of people is punishable 
with a 6-year imprisonment.
The laws were adopted with a number of procedural violations. While 
the Interior Minister Vitaliy Zakharchenko said in public that: “each 
off ence will be met by our side harshly”62.
The extent of the lack of understanding of the essence of the free-
dom of assembly in Ukraine is best proved by the fact that in 3 main 
cities there were no meetings held in 2012 at all. In an urban settle-
ment Rozivka (Zaporizhzhya oblast) with 3537 residents, no gatherings 
have been held since 2002, according to the city council data. The city 
council, meanwhile, designated the local airfi eld as the only place for 
public gatherings63. What is even more shocking is that according to 
the Ukrainian Helsinki Human Rights Union in 2012 the Ukrainian 
authorities sought to restrict peaceful gatherings in 358 cases and in 
90% of the cases they succeeded64.
62 Zakharchenko pledges harsh response to lawbreakers, “Kyiv Post” (http://www.kyivpost.
com/content/ukraine/zakharchenko-pledges-harsh-response-to-lawbreakers-335207.
html, accessed: 20 I 2016).
63 Ibidem.
64 Data available in part G of chapter G “Relevant domestic law and practice” of the 
ratio decidendi of the judgment of the European Court of Human Rights of 11 April 
2013 Vyerentsov v. Ukraine (http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001–118393, accessed: 
27 V 2016).
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3. Outline of the Polish regulations on freedom of assemblies
The most important legislative act in Poland which contains guarantees 
of freedom of assemblies is, like in Ukraine, the Constitution. Human 
rights and freedoms enjoy a high rank in the Polish Constitution, which 
is attested by placing said regulations before other issues. The Consti-
tution of 1997 contains a basic catalogue of these rights and freedoms 
and guarantees their “insuspensibility to the extent stipulated by inter-
national documents”65. According to Art. 57 of the Constitution: “The 
freedom of peaceful assembly and participation in such assemblies 
shall be ensured to everyone. Limitations upon such freedoms may be 
imposed by statute.” Thus, the freedom of gathering together should 
be considered as a freedom which can only be limited by a statute 
and which is available not only to Polish citizens but to foreigners as 
well. Moreover, the constitution recognises the freedom of assembly 
as inherent and inalienable. Therefore, the regulation on the freedom 
of assembly is, in a sense, declaratory66. 
The constitutional approach to freedom of assemblies results in the 
narrowing of legal regulation, which is essentially reduced to limita-
tions of freedom in the form of various bans, orders, and sanctions.67 
In Polish legal system, these bans, orders, and sanctions are primarily 
included in the Act on Assemblies of 24 July 2015 (Pol. Ustawa Prawo 
o zgromadzeniach)68, which on 14 October 2015 replaced the Law of 
Assemblies of 5 July 199069, which was in force for 25 years70. These 
65 M. Kruk, Przyczynek do rozważań o inspiracjach Konstytucji RP z 1997 r., “Państwo 
i Prawo” 2002, no. 12, p. 9. 
66 Cf. A. Wróbel, Wolność zgromadzania się, in: Wolności i prawa polityczne, ed. by 
W. Skrzydło, Kraków 2002, p. 11. More broadly on the interpretation of Art. 57 of the 
Condstitution in, e.g.: W. Sokolewicz, Wolności i prawa polityczne, in: Konstytucja RP. 
Komentarz (cz. IV), ed. by L. Garlicki, Warszawa 2005, p. 1–33; W. Skrzydło, Komentarz do 
art. 57 Konstytucji Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej, in: idem, Konstytucja Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej. 
Komentarz, Kraków 2002, p. 68.
67 B. Naleziński, Wolność zgromadzeń, in: Prawo konstytucyjne RP, ed. by P. Sarnecki, 
Warszawa 2008, p. 133.
68 J.L. item 1485.
69 Consolidated text: J.L. 2013, item 397 as amended.
70 It should be stressed that the issue of assemblies is not regulated in Poland by the 
Law of Assemblies Act alone. There is a range of special regulations, which indubitably 
inform the scope of the constitutional freedom of assemblies. These regulations concern 
the assemblies taking place in special locations, such as public roads, universities, or 
monuments of the Holocaust, assemblies occurring in special times, e.g., assemblies 
during emergencies or electoral rallies, or even the participation of soldiers in assemblies.
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normative acts of fairly limited volume specify, among other things, the 
legal defi nition of assembly, a number of prohibitions associated with 
participation in an assembly, formulate the scope of responsibilities 
of an organiser, and the procedure to cover the cases of assemblies. It 
is worth reminding that the Act of 1990 replaced, in turn, the Act of 
29 March 1962 on Assemblies (Pol. Ustawa o zgromadzeniach)71. The 
change in legal regulation carried out in 1990 was enormous, even 
revolutionary, as the 1962 Act on Assemblies was strongly anchored 
in the Socialist realities of the mid-20th century. It should be remarked 
here that the most recent changes to the legal regulation of assemblies 
in Poland were catalysed by the Judgment of the Constitutional Tribunal 
of 18 September 201472, in which the Tribunal declared many funda-
mental solutions of the previous regulation, including the defi nition of 
assembly, as unconstitutional.
Currently, therefore, an assembly in Poland is “a gathering of people 
in open space available to people not specifi ed by name in a specifi c 
location, convened in order to confer over an issue or with an aim to 
express jointly their position.” Whereas the previous legal regulation 
considered as an assembly “a gathering of at least 15 people, convened 
in order to confer over an issue or with an aim to express jointly their po-
sition” (Art. 1(2) of the Act of 5 July 1990). The main diff erence between 
the defi nitions quoted above is the departure from setting the minimum 
number of people forming an assembly. It is a justifi ed solution: some 
of the authors of literature felt for many years that the defi nition of as-
sembly was too narrow and the number of participants arbitrary73. There 
is no doubt that the new defi nition of assembly takes into account the 
standards formulated in decisions of the ECHR to a much greater degree 
than the previous one. What is more, in its judgment of 18 September 
2014 the Constitutional Tribunal found the earlier defi nition uncon-
stitutional; in the ratio the Tribunal referred to judgments delivered in 
Stankov and the United Macedonian Organisation v. Bulgaria (2 October 
2001), in Christian Democratic Peoples Party v. Moldova of 14 February 
71 J.L. No. 20, item 89 as amended.
72 J.L. item 1327.
73 Cf., e.g., P. Czarny, B. Naleziński, Wolność zgromadzeń, Warszawa 1998, p. 69. 
Wiśniewski also notes that the number 15 was adopted arbitrarily and is not justifi ed 
by the Polish tradition, as the previous acts did not quote any numbers (L. Wiśniewski, 
Wolność zgromadzeń w świetle prawa o zgromadzeniach, “Państwo i Prawo” 1991, no. 4, p. 41). 
More in: B. Kołaczkowski, op. cit., p. 86.
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2006 and in Primov v. Russia of 12 June 201474. In the author’s opinion, 
however, the most dubious part of the Polish defi nition has been and 
regrettably still is, the identifi cation of the aim of the assembly. It seems 
impossible to indicate beyond dispute any range of permissible aims 
which make gatherings into assemblies under the Act75. It is worth 
reminding here that Ukrainian law e does not contain any defi nition 
of assembly at all, and thus does not specify its aim either. Concerning 
the aim of an assembly, one should also remember that not only are 
administrative organs in Poland not authorised to analyse the slogans, 
ideas, and content which the assembly is to serve and which do not 
violate the rules of law in force but they do not have the competence to 
evaluate the aims of an assembly specifi ed in its notifi cation as apparent 
and deny permission on this basis, since such an evaluation “directly 
violates the essence of the freedom and political right, guaranteed by 
the Constitution, to organise and participate in peaceful assemblies”76. 
Polish administrative law, contrary to the Ukrainian one, provides 
a relatively complex classifi cation of assemblies. Considering the form 
of the resolution of an administrative organ regarding the possibility of 
organising an assembly, one can distinguish:
1. assemblies which require only a notice and a silent acceptance of 
the public authority competent to accept it;
2. spontaneous assemblies which do not require a notice; 
3. assemblies which require a prior permission (e.g., assemblies in 
the areas of Monuments of the Holocaust);
4. assemblies in the case of which it is necessary to agree the time and 
place of holding the assembly with the operator of the road (religious 
assemblies taking place on public roads).
Since recently, assemblies which require only a notice can in turn be 
divided into assemblies tied to potential obstructions in the traffi  c fl ow 
and those which do not cause obstructions in the traffi  c fl ow, particularly 
changes in its organisation.
74 The reasons for the judgment are available at the website of the Helsinki Foundation 
of Human Rights (www.hfh rpol.waw, accessed: 24 V 2016).
75 For instance, it is not clear whether the discussion of private matters can be an aim 
of an assembly. Polish literary sources say that even though an assembly is public, private 
matters fall in the range of aims of assembly; cf., e.g., H.E. Zadrożniak, Zgromadzenia 
publiczne jako forma udziału obywateli w życiu społecznym, “Samorząd Terytorialny” 2009, 
no. 5, p. 64. More in: B. Kołaczkowski, op. cit., p. 87–88.
76 Judgment of the Voivodeship Administrative Court (WSA) in Warsaw of 5 October 
2010 (VII SA/Wa 1856/10, LEX no. 760065). 
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It should be emphasised that neither a notice of a planned assembly, 
nor the requirement to procure a permission to hold an assembly is con-
trary to the judicial decisions of the European Court of Human Rights. In 
the judgment of 7 November 2009 in Skiba v. Poland77 the ECHR stated 
that the: “obligation to notify beforehand of a planned manifestation is 
not contrary to the provisions of Art. 11 of the European Convention of 
Human Rights as long as it does not constitute a hidden obstacle to the 
right to assembly”; In the Court’s opinion, a state may also impose an 
obligation of procurement a prior permission to hold an assembly and 
to regulate free movement of persons during an assembly. It was also 
emphasised in the ratio that the reason for making such restrictions is 
not arbitrary regulation of the use of the right but provision of the au-
thorities with reasonable time to take appropriate measures that on the 
one hand will cater for the right of certain persons to enjoy the freedom 
of a peaceful assembly, but, on the other hand safeguard the rights and 
interests of others, especially with regards free movement, as well will 
ensure public order and prevention of crime78.
It must be stressed that assemblies in Poland usually only require 
a notice, and the basic form of resolution by an administrative organ 
regarding the possibility of organising an assembly is silent accept-
ance. Its occurrence – in the case of assemblies – should be treated as 
a rule. In light of Art. 7(1) of the Act on Assemblies the organiser of an 
assembly shall notify the local authorities of an intent to organise an 
assembly in such a way that the notifi cation should arrive at the author-
ity, as a rule, no earlier than 30 days and no later than 6 days before 
the planned assembly date. Upon reception of the notifi cation of intent 
to organise an assembly, the authorities make the information about 
the time and place of the assembly available on the appropriate Public 
Information Bulletin website (Art. 7(3)). The terms of notifi cation and 
entities which should be notifi ed are defi ned slightly diff erently in the 
case of assemblies which do not cause obstructions in the traffi  c fl ow: an 
organiser of such an assembly notifi es the appropriate local (munici-
pal) crisis management centre or, if such has not been established in 
the municipality, the voivodeship crisis management centre, no earlier 
than 30 days and no later than 2 days before the planned assembly date 
77 No. 10659/03, in: M.A. Nowicki, Sławomir Skiba vs Poland ETCH judgment of 
7 July 2009, complaint No. 10659/03; theses actual state of aff airs and discussion), 
in: M.A. Nowicki, Europejski Trybunał. Wybór orzeczeń 2009, p. 327.
78 More in: B. Kołaczkowski, op. cit., p. 89.
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(Art. 22 of the Act on Assemblies). Naturally, while providing a deadline 
for notifi cations of assemblies is conventional, “their subjection to an 
authorisation procedure does not normally encroach upon the essence 
of the right” by itself79. 
Until recently, the basic form of state interference in freedom of as-
sembly in Poland was the issuing of a decision forbidding the assembly 
by the head of a municipality, or mayor of a city. Currently (since the 
new law of assemblies came into force), a local authority can issue such 
a decision only in the case of assemblies which may cause disturbanc-
es in the traffi  c fl ow. Under Art. 14, a local authority issues a decision 
prohibiting an assembly no later than 96 hours before the planned 
assembly date, provided that:
1. its aim violates freedom of peaceful assembly, holding it infringes 
Art. 480 or the rules of organising assemblies, or the aim of the assembly 
or holding it is in breach of the provisions of criminal law;
2. holding it may endanger life or health of people, or property in 
signifi cant quantities, including when the danger has not been alleviated 
in the cases described in Art. 12 or Art. 1381.
An issue in the Polish regulations limiting holding assemblies, which 
the legislator has been unable to successfully resolve for years, is the 
problem of competing assemblies, including counter-protests. Before 
2012, Polish law of assemblies, similarly to the Ukrainian regulations, did 
not contain appropriate regulations at all. While the entry into force of 
the 14 September 2012 act amending the Act on Assemblies82 resulted 
in the emergence of a regulation, it stirred a considerable controversy83. 
The regulations currently in force are not entirely well thought-out 
79 Decision of the European Court of Human Rights of 10 October 1979 in the case of 
Rassemblement Jurassien and Unité Jurassienne v. Switzerland (Application no. 8191/78).
80 Among other things, Art. 4 introduces a ban of participation in assemblies by people 
carrying arms, explosives, pyrotechnic articles, and other dangerous materials and tools.
81 The regulations in these articles concern the coincidence of assemblies. 
82 J.L. 2012, item 1115.
83 In 2012, a prohibition on holding assemblies organised by two or more organiser 
at the same time, at places or in routes of passage which are either the same or partially 
overlap unless it is possible to separate them or hold them in such a way that their course 
does not endanger life or health of people, or property in signifi cant quantities (Art. 6(2b) 
added to the Act of 5 July 1990). The primary source of controversy was the imprecision 
of the regulations introduced into the Act: it did not follow absolutely unambiguously 
from the Act whether, in the case that the organiser of the assembly notifi ed later did 
not fulfi l the obligation, for example, to change the place of the assembly, the authorities 
would be allowed to forbid the other assembly as well.
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either. There are doubts concerning – in the context of previous case-
law – the possibility of the authority to propose a change of place or 
time of the assembly, among other things84. The main objection, how-
ever, is the inconsistency of the legislator: for, if the possibility to issue 
a decision forbidding an assembly in the case of assemblies that would 
not cause disturbances in the traffi  c fl ow was abandoned, the possibil-
ity of preventing a counter-demonstration in such circumstances was 
also, somewhat “automatically”, excluded. Taking into account that the 
very mechanism of preventing assemblies organised by two or more 
organisers at the same time and place unless it is possible to separate 
them is such a way that their course does not endanger life or health 
of people, or property in signifi cant quantities, manifestly contradicts 
the guidelines of the Offi  ce for Democratic Institutions and Human 
Rights of the Organisation of Security and Cooperation in Europe and 
the European Commission for Democracy through Law at the Council 
of Europe on freedom of peaceful assemblies of 200785 and is addition-
ally contrary to the decisions issued by the European Court of Human 
Rights86, the lack of appropriate regulation in Ukraine should be con-
sidered the right solution. The guidelines unequivocally adopt the idea 
of the obligation of states to facilitate holding concurrent assemblies, 
assuming that a total prohibition of holding an assembly only because 
another assembly takes place at the same place and time would infringe 
the principle of proportionality.
In order to ensure public safety and order, it is necessary to formulate 
certain prohibitions and introduce explicit obligations for the organiser 
of the assembly. In Poland, similarly to Ukraine, persons carrying arms, 
explosives, pyrotechnic articles, and other dangerous materials and 
tools are not allowed to participate in assemblies (Art. 4(2) of the Act 
on Assemblies). There is one more limitation which serves to ensure 
84 Cf., e.g., the resolution of the Constitutional Tribunal of 16 March 1994 (W 8/93, 
LEX no. 20603). According to the Tribunal, the right to assembly includes not only the 
power to decide to hold an assembly but also to freely choose its time and place.
85 ODIHR – Venice Commission Guidelines on Freedom of Peaceful Assembly; the 
complete English 2nd edition of the document can be found online at: http://www.
hrea.org/erc/Library/display_doc.php?url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.osce.org%2Ffi les%2F
documents%2F4%2F0%2F73405.pdf&external=N (accessed: 20 XII 2015).
86 In the judgment in Öllinger v. Austria cited above, the Court stated that: “if each 
potential tension/possibility of creating tension or a violent confrontation of the opposing 
groups during a demonstration were to justify a ban on its holding, the society would 
be deprived of the possibility of hearing diff ering opinions.”
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public safety and order, concerning both the participants of an assem-
bly and third parties (such as the owners of restaurants and other food 
services located at the place of assembly), which is absent in Ukraine 
and – by the way – should be considered as controversial. Namely, “at 
the times and places of mass assemblies” it is forbidden “to sell, serve, 
and consume alcoholic beverages” (Art. 14(1)(3) of the Act of 26 Oc-
tober 1982 on Upbringing in Sobriety and Counteracting Alcoholism 
(original Polish: Ustawa o wychowaniu w trzeźwości i przeciwdziałaniu 
alkoholizmo wi)87. Whereas the locations of mass assemblies are plac-
es “where alcohol consumption may have negative eff ects associated, 
among other things, with the diffi  culties in ensuring eff ective control 
of the number of participants, which can neither be roughly predicted 
nor controlled”88, the harshness and imprecision of this provision gives 
rise to doubts and may increase the likelihood of making errors in 
determining the facts. The fundamental problem here seems to be the 
inability to unambiguously interpret the notions of “mass assembly”89 
and “location of the assembly”, not to mention the probably excessive 
restriction of the rights of third parties, such as garden restaurant owners. 
The scope of obligations of the head of the assembly is defi ned much 
more specifi cally in Poland than in Ukraine (also, while the organiser 
of an assembly does not have to be its head in Poland, the Ukrainian 
regulation does not distinguish between these two terms). The head of 
an assembly directs it (Art. 18(1) of the Act on Assemblies). Both the 
organiser and the head are obligated to “ensure that the assembly pro-
ceeds in accordance with the law and to conduct it in such a way as to 
prevent damage caused by the participants of the assembly” (Art. 19(1) 
of the Act). The main measure to fulfi l this obligation is the requirement 
of the head of the assembly to demand that a person whose behaviour 
infringes the provisions of the Act or obstructs or attempts to thwart the 
assembly should leave it. In the case that the demand was not obeyed, 
the head of the assembly asks the Police or municipal guard for help 
(Art. 19(5) of the Act). The fi nal measure is the obligation, also imposed 
on the head, to dissolve the assembly “if the participants of the assembly 
87 Consolidated text: J.L. 2015, item 1286 as amended.
88 G. Zalas, Komentarz do art. 14 ustawy o wychowaniu w trzeźwości i przeciwdziałaniu 
alkoholizmowi, LEX no. 72368.
89 The notion of mass assembly is used in the Polish administrative law system – as 
the WSA in Poznań rightly observed in its judgment of 24 February 2010 (II SA/Po 670/09, 
LEX no. 542035) – exclusively by the Act on Upbringing in Sobriety and Counteracting 
Alcoholism.
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do not comply with his instructions or when the course of the assembly 
violates the provisions of this Act or criminal law” (Art. 19(6) of the Act). 
It is worth noting here that the imposition on the organiser and head 
of the obligation to conduct an assembly in such a way as to “prevent 
damage caused by the fault of participants of the assembly” can be 
considered controversial, since it is not diffi  cult to imagine situations 
in which damages caused damage caused by the fault of participants 
of an assembly, in particular regarding the diffi  culty to unambiguously 
distinguish a participant of an assembly from a third party (public as-
semblies are assumed to be open, after all)90. 
Institutions which are completely absent from the Ukrainian regu-
lation are the representative of authorities delegated to an assembly 
and the institution of spontaneous assemblies, highly important in any 
democratic state of law91. According to Art. 17(1) of the Polish Act on 
Assemblies, a local (municipal) authority can designate a representa-
tive to participate in an assembly, which designation is obligatory in 
the case where there is a risk of disturbance to public order during the 
assembly. The representative of local authorities can dissolve an assem-
bly (which is the essence of his function) when its course endangers 
the life or health of people or large quantities of property, or when it 
violates the provisions of criminal law and the head of the assembly has 
been warned by the representative of communal authorities that it is 
necessary to dissolve the assembly but does not dissolve it (Art. 20(1) of 
the Act on Assemblies). Regarding spontaneous assemblies, it is worth 
stressing here that the appropriate legal regulation is a novelty in Poland: 
it only appeared in the Act of 2015. Thus, in line with the wording of 
Art. 3(2) of the new Act, a spontaneous assembly is “an assembly taking 
place in connection with a sudden event in the public sphere which 
could not be predicted earlier, and when holding it at another time 
would be inappropriate or of little signifi cance from the perspective of 
the public debate.” It is obvious that the supervision of assemblies which 
are not subject to the notifi cation procedure has to be relatively strong. 
Namely, contrary to notifi ed assemblies, a spontaneous assembly can 
be dissolved by the offi  cer directing Police operations in a number of 
circumstances, e.g., when the assembly causes a signifi cant threat to 
90 More in: B. Kołaczkowski, op. cit., p. 152–153.
91 “Sometimes spontaneity is the only guarantee of successful criticism, protest, 
or actively drawing the attention of the public opinion to a given issue” (A. Bodnar, 
M. Ziółkowski, Zgromadzenia spontaniczne, “Państwo i Prawo” 2008, no. 5, p. 41).
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the safety or order of traffi  c on a public road or, as is the case of other 
assemblies, when the course of the assembly endangers the life or health 
of people, large quantities of property, or causes a signifi cant threat to 
safety or public order (Art. 28(1) of the Act on Assemblies). Moreover, 
the legislator rightly gave a certain preference in exercising freedom of 
assemblies to participants of assemblies organised under general rules. 
Specifi cally, the participants of a spontaneous assembly cannot disturb 
the course of other assemblies; such disturbances is yet another premise 
for the dissolution of the spontaneous assembly by the offi  cer directing 
Police operations (Art. 27 of the Act on Assemblies).
Conclusion
Adopting the scope and depth of administrative limitation of freedom of 
assemblies as a yardstick for evaluating the stage of development of de-
mocracy has proved to be successful in the area of comparative studies 
of Ukrainian and Polish law. The analysis of numerous normative acts, 
literature, and case-law in both countries allowed to draw many inter-
esting conclusions. What comes to the fore here are the international 
law issues. It should be noted, therefore, that both countries adopted 
the most important conventions, both at European and global levels, 
which directly or indirectly guarantee freedom of assemblies. However, 
the compliance of the domestic law in Ukraine with these conventions 
gives rise to serious doubts. While freedom of assemblies in Ukraine 
is guaranteed by the constitution, like in Poland, the similarities end 
there. The lack of a modern act to collectively regulate the issues of 
public assemblies – as the Polish Act on Assemblies does – can hardly 
be seen as positive. Selective application of regulations adopted by the 
USSR that are unfi t to the realities of a democratic state, combined with 
the constitutionally expressed right of the courts to impose limitations 
on freedom of assemblies are conditions conducive to entirely arbitrary 
decisions, which indubitably violates the essence of the freedom (it 
is worth mentioning here the national security, which is the general 
constitutional premise to restrict freedom of assemblies, and the lack 
of specifi c regulations regarding the supervision of assemblies). The 
absence of a legal defi nition of assembly and case-law contrary to nor-
mative regulations which – fortunately – usually takes international 
law standards into account (although most frequently it does not refer 
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directly to the judgments of the European Court of Human Rights), 
complete the image of the chaos. The case-law analysed in this study 
indicate that, for instance, the notifi cation deadline of several hours, 
referred to in court judgments, at least partially solves the problem of 
the lack of regulation concerning spontaneous assemblies.
Poland, in turn, consistently fails to incorporate the provisions of the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child in its domestic law; this problem 
has a diff erent dimension in Ukraine, where the domestic regulation 
shaping the administrative limitation of assemblies is vestigial and it can 
be assumed that the provisions of the Convention are applied directly 
in the absence of other regulations. Thus, paradoxically, as a result of 
the lack of provisions which might contradict the solutions adopted 
in acts of international law, Ukrainian law complies with international 
law regulations concerning the exercise of freedom of assemblies by 
persons with disabilities to a greater extent than Polish law. 
It is beyond doubt that the administrative legal regulation of assem-
blies in Poland is signifi cantly more mature, whereas the administrative 
limitation of such events is necessarily deeper in Ukraine. The Act on 
Assemblies in force in Poland includes a defi nition of assembly, defi nes 
types of assemblies, obligations of organisers, as well as the supervisory 
powers of the authorities. However, it is diffi  cult to regard Polish domes-
tic law as exemplary either. This law is being changed too frequently, 
regulations are not always consistent, and the processes of excessive 
tightening of specifi c solutions (e.g., concerning competing assemblies 
which is, further, contrary to the judgments of the European Court of 
Human Rights) are mixed with perhaps too far-reaching relaxation 
of provisions (e.g., the lack of possibility to issue a decision forbidding 
an assembly – unless it is associated with the use of a public road or 
takes place, for instance, in the area of a Monument of the Holocaust 
and thus is subject to a separate regulation). 
Concluding, it is worth stressing that Poland and Ukraine are the 
two European countries which suff ered from totalitarianism the most. 
The experiences of both countries are similar to some extent, provided 
that the democratic transformations in Ukraine have been (and still are) 
defi nitively more tumultuous than in Poland, and the whole process 
began many years later. It is thus natural that in the sphere of human 
rights and freedoms which are of fundamental importance for these 
transformations, the state of Ukraine faces signifi cant challenges. It is 
also clear that Ukraine should take advantage of Polish experiences 
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and learn from the mistakes of Poland as well. What is beyond doubt, 
however, is that Ukraine – at least from the viewpoint of the guarantees 
of exercise of freedom of assemblies – is at the beginning of its road 
to democracy, in a place similar, tentatively, to the end of the 1980s in 
Poland. The immaturity of the Ukrainian regulation regarding freedom 
of assembly is so substantial that it practically hinders any direct com-
parative analysis in the scope of detailed solutions.
ADMINISTRACYJNE OGRANICZENIA WOLNOŚCI ZGROMADZEŃ 
NA UKRAINIE I W POLSCE W ŚWIETLE UREGULOWAŃ PRAWA 
MIĘDZYNARODOWEGO – REFLEKSJE NA TEMAT UKRAIŃSKIEJ DROGI 
DO DEMOKRACJI
S t r e s z c z e n i e
Przedmiotem opracowania jest umiejscowiona w kontekście uregulowań prawno-
międzynarodowych oraz orzecznictwa Europejskiego Trybunału Praw Człowieka 
analiza porównawcza kształtu administracyjnej reglamentacji zgromadzeń na Ukra-
inie i w Polsce. W jego pierwszej części dokonano analizy tych spośród wiążących 
Ukrainę i Polskę aktów prawa międzynarodowego, w których podejmowana jest 
problematyka zgromadzeń, m.in. Międzynarodowego Paktu Praw Obywatelskich 
i Politycznych, Europejskiej Konwencji o Ochronie Praw Człowieka i Podstawowych 
Wolnościach czy też Konwencji Ramowej o Ochronie Mniejszości Narodowych. 
Część druga dotyczy zagadnień konstytucyjnych gwarancji wolności zgromadzeń na 
Ukrainie oraz dopuszczalnych w prawie tego kraju ograniczeń tej wolności. Wreszcie 
trzecia część zawiera refl eksje na temat kształtu administracyjnoprawnej regulacji 
zgromadzeń w Polsce, obejmujące przede wszystkim zagadnienia defi nicji zgroma-
dzenia, klasyfi kacji zgromadzeń i wreszcie obowiązków organizatora oraz uprawnień 
porządkowych władz, takich jak np. możliwość rozwiązania zgromadzenia. W pracy 
wykazano między innymi, że wprawdzie na Ukrainie, podobnie jak w Polsce, wolność 
zgromadzeń gwarantowana jest konstytucyjnie, ale na tym podobieństwa się kończą. 
Trudno ocenić pozytywnie brak nowoczesnej ustawy, która zbiorczo regulowałaby 
zagadnienia zgromadzeń publicznych tak jak polska ustawa Prawo o zgromadzeniach. 
Wybiórcze stosowanie zupełnie nieprzystających do realiów państwa demokratycz-
nego przepisów uchwalonych jeszcze w ZSRR, w połączeniu z konstytucyjnie wyra-
żonym prawem sądów do wprowadzania ograniczeń wolności zgromadzeń, sprzyja 
skrajnej arbitralności podejmowanych rozstrzygnięć, co niewątpliwie narusza istotę 
wolności. Problemem polskiej administracyjnoprawnej regulacji zgromadzeń są 
z kolei częste i nie zawsze przemyślane zmiany odpowiednich przepisów. Nie ulega 
jednak wątpliwości, że Polską regulację prawną można uznać za znacznie dojrzalszą. 
Słowa kluczowe: zgromadzenia w Polsce i na Ukrainie – porządek publiczny – 
administracyjna reglamentacja
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